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ABSTRACT
A novel version of a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
game tests how player cooperation responds to changes in
incentives, i.e., payoffs that depend on performance relative
to different reference groups. Cooperation is greatest when
players are competing against players in other four-person
groups, intermediate when competition is diffused, and low-
est when players compete in a zero-sum game within their
own group.
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Cooperation, Free Riding and the Environment
How do you get thousands of college students to use less water in the
middle of a drought when they pay nothing for it? In 2014, 2,100
students in 14 residential dormitories at the University of California,
Merced, competed in a “water battle” to see which dorm could use
the least water (Anderson, 2014). The battle reduced water consump-
tion, incentivized leak repairs, and raised overall awareness of water
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conservation on a campus that sits in the middle of California’s water-
scarce Central Valley. This competition changed the incentives for long
showers by aggregating individuals into teams that needed to cooperate
to beat other teams. One team won, but all teams helped reduce campus
water consumption.
Contrast this story to one in which individual farmers compete
for water in a shared aquifer, thereby increasing total energy use and
lowering local water security. Although groundwater users can achieve
positive-sum gains by managing a shared aquifer to maximize sustainable
yield over time, those gains will be lost if they try to out-pump each
other. That is happening just down the road from UC Merced, where
competition over agricultural groundwater has resulted in dry pumps,
dropping ground levels and damage to local infrastructure (Goldenberg,
2015). This game of “all against all” could be stopped if farmers could
collectively monitor and control groundwater use, but the provision of
these public goods is blocked by non-cooperation and weak institutions.
Every farmer complains about the others, but no farmer has been willing
or able to shift from selfish to collective behavior.
This paper investigates how incentives can help or hinder the pro-
vision of public goods in an experimental setting. Public goods, like
common-pool goods, are non-excludable in their provision and use,
which means that they are vulnerable to free riding (taking benefits
without paying costs) by some at the expense of others. Free riding
undermines cooperation and contributes to the under-provision of pub-
lic goods or over-appropriation of common-pool goods, both of which
figure prominently in discussions of environmental management and
sustainability (Ostrom et al., 1994).
The examples from the Central Valley concerned appropriation of
common-pooled waters, but they also showed how internal norms or
formal rules can create public goods that benefit everyone, i.e., the
provision of organization for a “water battle” or lack of organization to
avoid over-pumping groundwater.
This paper contributes to the literature on strategic behavior and
the environment by exploring the impacts of structures and incentives
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on the provision of public goods. It does so by comparing four versions
of a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) that produces a public
good whose benefits are shared among players. In all treatments, players
begin in a first stage in which their contributions to a VCM result in raw
earnings that reflect a tension between free riding for individual gain
versus cooperation to maximize group earnings. In the second stage,
raw earnings are transformed into final earnings via a formula that
depends on which of the four Treatment Comparison Groups (TCGs)
applies to that game session. This two-step process makes it easier
to answer the main research question, which is “how does cooperation
change when the TCG changes?”
Skipping ahead for a moment, experimental results indicate that
between-group competition leads to the greatest in-group — and thus
overall — cooperation among players. This “beat the other team”
treatment (similar to the water battle example) performed much better
than the “beat your teammates” treatment (similar to the groundwater
example) in which players competed for a fixed sum within their group of
four. The beat-the-other-team treatment also had decent performance
against treatments in which each player competed against all other
players (“beat everyone else”) or faced no competitive reference (the
baseline, first-stage treatment).
Although the experiments were context-neutral, their VCM struc-
tures created similar incentives to those affecting environmental goods.
In a direct application, these results might help one explore the provi-
sion of regulation or cooperation within an organization. In a “flipped”
application, these results may contribute to efforts to prevent over-
appropriation. These mirrored incentives should make it easier to
design or implement interventions. Farmers, for instance, might be re-
warded (or penalized) for discharging less (or more) non-point pollutants
than neighboring groups.
This paper develops as follows. The next section explains how
free riding and cooperation affect environmental goods. The following
section explains the experimental treatments, hypotheses and protocol.
After reviewing results, the discussion section expands on the design
and outcomes before suggesting some environmental applications in the
conclusion.
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Free Riding Reduces the Supply of Non-Excludable Goods
Many economists work with excludable private and club goods that can
be created, traded and consumed within a framework of property-rights
and markets. That framework does not work very well for managing non-
excludable public and common-pool goods that are subject to free riding
in provision and consumption respectively. In their analysis of non-
excludable goods, Ostrom et al. (1994) say a common-pool “situation”
has turned into a “dilemma” when free riding leads to the suboptimal
under-provision of a public good or over-appropriation from a common-
pool good at the same time as institutional reform could conceivably
improve matters. Their book is devoted to addressing these dilemmas
(also known as open-access dilemmas) by understanding and changing
institutions to reduce free riding. It is important to note that most
of their analysis and suggestions apply to non-market settings where
community or government power structures rely on non-cooperative or
cooperative rules, respectively.
Most environmental problems can be traced to common-pool dilem-
mas, i.e., the under-provision or over-consumption of goods. A com-
munity that fails to contribute to public-good defenses or storage is
vulnerable to flood or drought. Consumers who fail to internalize their
negative externalities will pollute, and thus deplete, local or global
environments. These suboptimal outcomes could be lessened or avoided
if individuals gave less weight to their near-term, private payoffs and
more weight to long-run, group payoffs.
The results of such rebalanced priorities can be seen in experimental
or empirical settings where different behaviors interact. When free
riders earn (or take) larger payoffs at the expense of others, they lower
overall group efficiency. When cooperators share the burden of providing
collective goods, they help increase average payoffs and thus increase
group efficiency. In most situations, reciprocators magnify the actions
of free riders or cooperators by matching negative or positive actions,
thereby creating a positive feedback loop that drives outcomes towards
negative or positive extremes respectively. Environmental parallels are
clear. Cooperation to protect local ecosystems will, for example, result
in greater shared benefits, and those benefits will encourage further
cooperation to protect the resource.
These dynamics are present in many communities, each with their
own level of cooperation and free riding in the provision of public
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goods and/or appropriation from common-pool goods. Although some
might consider those dynamics and outcomes as exogenous and path
dependent, there are many instances in which changes to incentive
structures have altered environmental outcomes (Carson, 1962; Joskow
et al., 1998; Schuerhoff et al., 2013; Wolsko et al., 2016). These examples
justify research into the institutions and incentives affecting behavior.
Designing Experiments to Understand Cooperation
A VCM game recreates the incentives relevant to the provision of public
goods because players know they can cooperate by contributing but free
ride by holding back. A novel modification of this VCM design tests
how (or if) behavior changes in each of four treatments that alter payoff
functions by changing the TCG. In the first stage of all treatments, each
group of four players plays a VCM game to determine its raw token earn-
ings. In the VCM, a player loses 1.0 token for each token they contribute
from their endowment to their group public good (GPG) and gains 0.5
tokens for each token contributed to their GPG by any player, i.e., a
marginal per capita return, or MPCR, of 0.5 on contributions. In the
second stage, the treatments differ in how they transform VCM earnings
into final token earnings using a formula that varied by treatment. This
two-stage format increases the probability that observed outcomes differ
with the treatment rather than other variables because all players begin
from the same first-stage foundation. The next Section (“Experimental
Details”) provides a precise description of each treatment, but here is
a brief overview and motivation for testable hypotheses.
Treatment 1 (baseline) Final tokens equal raw tokens. Results in
this baseline VCM case will reflect “typical” free-riding/cooperation
behavior under incentives that reduce individual payouts with
contributions to the GPG. Contributions and payouts in other
groups do not affect this strategy. Although there is an incentive
for players to cooperate in this repeated game to increase total
payoffs (and thus individual payoffs) via strategies of reciprocation,
backwards induction suggests that final-round free riding will lead
to cooperation unraveling all the way to earlier rounds, i.e., a
Nash equilibrium in which each player contributes nothing and
all players earn their endowments.
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Treatment 2 (own group) Each group divides a fixed quantity of
final tokens among its four members according to relative raw
tokens, i.e., if one player has twice the raw tokens of another
in the same group, the first player’s final earnings are double
the second player’s earnings. Since each group’s total earnings
are fixed, incentives for cooperation are absent. This treatment
has the same theoretical Nash equilibrium as Treatment 1, but
actual contributions will be lower if boundedly rational or other
non-equilibrium perspectives affect choices (Kahneman, 2011).
Treatment 3 (other groups) Final tokens depend on each player’s
raw earnings relative to members of other groups. Inside group
incentives are the same as in Treatment 1, but final earnings rise
as individual raw earnings exceed those of players in other groups.
The theoretical outcome here — given the exogeneity of actions
in other groups — is the same as in Treatment 1. Empirically,
contributions will be higher if players change their focus from
free riding within their group to cooperating to beat other teams.
This change of focus is augmented by the extrinsic incentive of
payoffs rising (within-group MPCR > 0.5) in groups producing a
larger GPG than other groups.
Treatment 4 (all players) All players divide a fixed number of final
tokens in proportion to individual raw earnings among all players.
In addition to the same Nash equilibrium (contribute nothing),
this treatment does not incentivize in-group cooperation as much
as Treatment 3 nor discourage it as much as Treatment 2. Av-
erage cooperation will be higher than in Treatment 1 if players
see cooperation within their group as a way to help themselves
individually against players in other groups. Cooperation will be
lower if players think the cap on total payouts limits the marginal
return to cooperation and encourages them to grab a larger share
of their group’s GPG.
These four treatments explore different elements affecting VCM
cooperation and outcomes. Although all treatments have a theoretical
Nash equilibrium of zero contribution to the GPG, team identity or
bounded rationality might lead to positive cooperation in all treatments
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Kahneman, 2011; Kurzban et al., 2001).
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The presence of tournament incentives, on the other hand, will reduce
cooperation by rewarding players for relative rather than absolute
earnings (Andreoni, 1995; Houser and Kurzban, 2002). These influences
affect stage-two payoffs by varying the TCG and thus — via a single
step of backwards induction — stage-one contributions to the public
good. Taking as given the interdependence of the four players in each
group in stage one, note that final payoffs depend on zero other players
(if 20 in total for the session) in Treatment 1, three other players in
Treatment 2, fifteen other players in Treatment 3, and nineteen other
players in Treatment 4.
More importantly, those other players are also collected in TCGs
that affect aggregate dynamics. Treatment 1 provides a “plain vanilla”
scenario testing cooperation (or lack thereof) in providing the public
good. Treatments 2 and 3 add TCGs that might affect cooperation.
Players in Treatment 2 are stuck in a zero-sum game within their groups
(each an independent TCG) since a higher payoff to one member leaves
less of the group’s fixed total for the other three members. Treatment 3
inverts that scenario by rewarding (punishing) players within one group
when other groups cooperate less (more). Treatment 4 shifts the focus
from group performance to individual ranking by allocating shares from
the fixed total according to a player’s performance relative to the TCG
of all other players.
These treatments recreate real-world incentive structures where
communities depend on citizen cooperation to produce a public good
that benefits all. Treatment 1 resembles the baseline case where coop-
eration (contribution) depends on intrinsic motivation. Treatment 2
recreates a zero-sum game with no incentive to cooperate — the case of
winner-takes-all competitions. Treatment 3 creates incentives to coop-
erate within teams without addressing monitoring or shirking (Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972; Berg et al., 1995). Treatment 4 creates a slightly
stronger incentive to free ride by reallocating to those who earn (free
ride) the most.
Other researchers have investigated the impacts of changing VCM
incentives. Andreoni (1995) conducted a VCM experiment with a “Rank
treatment” similar to Treatment 2 that was meant to push players
to the Nash equilibrium of zero contributions. Rank players had the
lowest contribution levels compared to his baseline version of Treat-
ment 1 (a result confirmed by Houser and Kurzban (2002)’s enhanced
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version of Andreoni), but he did not test a version of Treatment 4.
Ule et al. (2009) made this comparison using a modified dictator-game
to compare the effects of tournament incentives inside groups and across
all players. They found that players competing within-group (Treat-
ment 2) punish more and cooperate less than players competing across
all groups (Treatment 4). These results suggest that it may be easier
to affect cooperation than eliminate it (Anderies et al., 2011). Turning
to in-group/out-group dynamics, Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) find
that players inside a group cooperate more if between-group conflicts
exist, a result affirmed (and explored in detail) in the meta-analysis
of in-group/out-group cooperation by Balliet et al. (2014), who con-
clude that in-group favoritism has a stronger impact on cooperation
than out-group derogation. Bornstein et al. (2002) study the impact
of these structures, finding that collective efficiency is higher with in-
tergroup competition than without it, i.e., Treatment 3 relative to
Treatment 1.
Although no paper covered all four treatments (this one may be
the first), a casual summary of this literature suggests that cooperation
will be lower in Treatments 2 and 4 than in Treatment 1 due to anti-
cooperative and tournament incentives, respectively, while Treatment 3
should have more cooperation than Treatment 1 due to its stronger
teamwork incentives. The following sections will explain how these
expectations were rephrased as null hypotheses and tested.
Experimental Details
In each of four treatments, players contribute tokens to a public-goods
account within each group. Given players indexed as individuals (i ∈
[1 . . . h . . . I]) in groups (g ∈ [1 . . . k . . . G]), ph,k — the raw earnings for
player h in group k — are:




where E is each player’s token endowment, ch,k is the token contribution
of player h in group k to their GPG, ci,k are contributions from all
players in group k to their GPG, n is the number of group members, and
m is the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to each token contributed
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to the GPG. For 0 < m < 1 < m∗n, this is the usual linear public-goods
game, with a Nash equilibrium of zero contributions by all and a social
optimum where all players contribute their entire endowment.
These bounds are tested in each treatment, where the formula
for converting raw earnings (ph,k) to final tokens (πh,k) differs. The
Appendix reproduces the instructions explaining these payoff incentives
to experimental participants.
Treatment 1 (baseline)
Player h in group k receives final token earnings πh,k equal to their raw
tokens, i.e.,
πh,k = ph,k.
Total payments are not fixed, but each group’s earnings are limited
to a maximum of mnE.
Treatment 2 (own group)
A player’s share of the fixed quantity of final tokens (F ) depends on









This is a pure in-group tournament structure. The Nash equilibrium
has not changed compared to the baseline, but there is no social optimum
(or, to be correct, each combination of contributions is a social optimum),
since each group always earns — or divides — F .
Treatment 3 (other groups)
A player’s final earnings relative to an arbitrary fixed “targeted earning”
(T ) depends on their raw earnings relative to average raw earnings of
















Unlike the case for Treatments 2 and 4, total payouts in this treat-
ment are not fixed. Although T anchors earnings, uncertainty over the
118 Zetland
ratios of players’ raw earnings means that total payments to players are
also uncertain.
The Nash equilibrium prediction does not change — each player
hopes that his group has a high contribution level but still has an
incentive to contribute nothing. As in Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994),
the desire for a group total higher than that of other groups does not
change the individual’s incentive to contribute nothing. That said, it is
clearly better if players on other teams earn less.
Treatment 4 (all players)
A player’s share of the total fixed quantity of final tokens (G∗F ) depends









Incentives to cooperate inside the group are stronger than in Treat-
ment 2 but weaker than in Treatment 3. Total payments are fixed in
advance at GF .
Sample Payoffs Among Treatments
Table 1 illustrates how the formulas above convert the same set of
contributions into final token earnings for each treatment, given n =
4, G = 4,m = 0.5, E = 50, T = 75 and F = 300. Raw earnings are not
shown, but players who receive feedback and are paid based on final
tokens know that their raw earnings are only relevant insofar as they
translate into final token earnings.
Experimental Protocol
In each of eight sessions, different sets of participants played an un-
related but similar public-goods game (Game 1) before playing the
game discussed here (Game 2) on UC Davis computers running zTree
software (Fischbacher, 2007). In each session, players in Game 1 are
randomly reshuffled into new groups of four in Game 2 to break mo-
mentum. (There was no statistically significant correlation between
Game 1 and Game 2 cooperation results across all sessions.) Players
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Table 1: A comparison of payoffs among treatments to Member 1 (π1,1) and Members
2–4 of Group 1 (π2−4,1) given 0 or 50 token contributions by Member 1 in Group 1
(c1,1), Members 2–4 in Group 1 (c2−4,1), and the 12 other members of Groups 2–4
(c1−4,2−4).
Contributions Payoffs to π1,1, π2−4,1 in
c1,1, c2−4,1, c1−4,2−4 T1 T2 T3 T4
0, 0, 0 50, 50 75, 75 75, 75 75, 75
0, 0, 50 50, 50 75, 75 38, 38 43, 43
0, 50, 0 125, 75 107, 64 188, 113 158, 95
50, 0, 0 25, 75 30, 90 38, 113 35, 106
50, 50, 0 100, 100 75, 75 150, 150 120, 120
0, 50, 50 125, 75 107, 64 94, 56 97, 58
50, 0, 50 25, 75 30, 90 19, 56 21, 62
50, 50, 50 100, 100 75, 75 75, 75 75, 75
stayed in the same group for all eight periods of Game 2, anonymous
and non-communicative.
Game 2 was designed and played in three rounds of eight periods
each to allow a different treatment in the middle round (the first and
third rounds used the same treatment), but that structure introduced
noise into play (and the data), so this paper only reports results from
the first round of eight periods Each of the four treatments was run
twice with 16 or 20 players in the first round of eight periods, so there
are 1,216 observations for 152 players. Results are reported below in
descriptive terms and then via panel regressions testing the impact of
treatment on contributions after controlling for the period of play and
random effects by player.
In each session, players heard instructions for the relevant treatment
(see Appendix) before starting play. In each of eight periods, players
divided their endowment of 50 tokens between their private account
and the GPG. Players had 40 seconds to make their initial contribution
decision in period 1 and 20 seconds to decide in other periods. At the
end of each period, players had 40 seconds to inspect their raw and final
token earnings on the profit screen (see Appendix for examples).
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Results
Treatment effects are first tested by comparing mean player contributions
with the GPG, by period. (Individual contributions are tested below.)
The mean for each period is composed of 36 or 40 individual player
contributions since each treatment was run twice with 16 or 20 players.
Figure 1 and Table 2 show these means. From a descriptive perspective,
mean player contributions are highest in Treatment 3 and progressively
lower in Treatments 1, 4 and 2. Treatment 3 has the highest (or tied
for highest) mean contribution in seven of eight periods. Treatment 2
has the lowest (or tied for lowest) mean contribution in seven of eight
periods.
In two-sided pairwise t-tests comparing mean contributions by period
(eight observations), Treatment 1 contributions are higher than those
in Treatment 2 (p < 0.017), lower than those in Treatment 3 (p <
0.023), and statistically similar in Treatment 4 (p < 0.167). In similar
tests, Treatment 2 contributions are lower than those in Treatment 3
Figure 1: Although average player contributions to the group’s public-goods account
falls as sessions progress, the ordering of treatments by average contributions is
reasonably stable.
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Table 2: Mean contributions per period, by treatment (each run twice) with the
mean for all eight periods.
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Average
1 Baseline 29 26 27 22 20 22 28 19 24.2
2 Own group 31 26 20 16 17 18 15 13 19.4
3 Other groups 33 30 31 31 31 28 24 22 28.8
4 All players 32 26 25 23 19 17 16 14 21.7
Table 3: Panel regression (random-effects GLS) results comparing Treatment 3
(omitted dummy) with other treatments for 1,216 observations, controlling for
characteristics of 152 players via random effects.
Contribution Coef. Std. Err. p > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Period −1.77 0.16 0.00 −2.09 −1.45
Treatment 1 −4.60 3.27 0.16 −11.02 1.81
Treatment 2 −9.35 3.19 0.00 −15.61 −3.09
Treatment 4 −7.11 3.19 0.03 −13.36 −0.85
Constant 36.74 2.43 0.00 31.98 41.51
R2 (overall) = 0.08 Wald χ2(4) = 126.82 (p = 0.00)
ρ (fraction of variance due to player) = 0.50
(p < 0.001) or Treatment 4 (p < 0.036). In the last pairwise comparison,
Treatment 3 contributions are higher than those in Treatment 4 (p <
0.036). In sum, mean contributions in Treatment 3 are higher than in
statistically similar Treatments 1 and 4, both of which are statistically
higher than mean contributions in Treatment 2.
Regression analysis allows a deeper look into the data, via a panel
model that regresses contribution on period and dummies for treatment,
controlling for random effects by player. Treatments were compared by
rotating through the omitted treatment dummy to examine their relative
impacts. Table 3 shows the output for the most relevant comparison of
Treatment 3 to other treatments. The results allow us to reject the null
that Treatment 3 has the same impact on contributions as Treatment 4
or 2, but not for Treatment 1. Although the estimated coefficients from
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the regressions match the averages in Table 2 in relative magnitudes,
the coefficients are only significant in the comparison of Treatment 3
with Treatments 4 and 2. We cannot reject the null that Treatment 1
has the same impact as Treatment 3.
Discussion
Taken together, these results indicate that players in a public-goods
game cooperate more when their payoffs depend on their earnings
relative to players in other groups (Treatment 3) rather than in relation
to those of other players (Treatment 4) or players in their own group
(Treatment 2). Although there was not enough data to separate the
effects of Treatments 3 and 1, the coefficients, averages and t-tests all
lean in the direction of better cooperation results in Treatment 3. This
trend is supported by looking at total contributions (i.e., “aggregate
cooperation”) for all players in all eight periods. In comparison to
Treatment 3 (100 percent), contributions in Treatments 1, 4 and 2 were
only at 84, 84 and 75 percent of Treatment 3’s level, respectively. A
statistical test comparing total contributions in the sample estimates
that Treatment 3 would have higher total contributions in the population
(p < 0.05) than the other three treatments would (Treatments 1, 2 and
4 are statistically similar in contribution totals).
The zero-sum incentive structure in Treatment 2, which led to the
least cooperation, suggests that a scheme dividing a fixed reward within
a team may lead to poor cooperation and outcomes. The value of
the opposite recommendation — rewarding a team for beating another
team on progress towards a clear target — is oppositely positive, as
Treatment 3 had the highest cooperation. That result may have reflected
the potential to increase total payoffs via cooperation, but the same
incentive existed in Treatment 1, which may explain its statistically
similar regression performance in comparison with Treatment 3.
Conclusion
This paper used four experimental treatments to investigate how changes
in incentives affected behavior in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
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(VCM), or public goods, game. The greatest VCM cooperation resulted
when players were rewarded for earning more than players in other
groups, just as the lowest cooperation resulted from rewarding players
who beat others in their own group. These results suggest that it may be
easier to promote cooperation in providing public goods by encouraging
teams to beat other teams rather than encouraging cooperation within
a team.
Taking the basic incentives of a public goods game as a baseline
(i.e., an incentive to free ride), these results indicate how to restructure
incentives to improve cooperation in restoring ecosystems by promoting
cooperation and suppressing free riding. The “Adopt a Highway” pro-
grams popular in the U.S. replace bureaucratic cleaning schedules with
competition among teams responsible for keeping their “share” of the
highway clean. The success of the SO2 cap and trade market can be
traced to each polluter’s incentive to reduce emissions faster than others
in order to collect financial and reputational rewards (Schmalensee and
Stavins, 2013).
These experimental results are congruent with known successes yet
helpful in exploring different models affecting experimental cooperation
in the provision of public goods. These incentive structures should




(1) Welcome. We are starting now.
(2) Please turn off your cell phones.
(3) Does anyone have questions about the Bill of Rights or Consent
Form? [WAIT]
(4) Please sign the bill of rights and both copies of the consent form.
(The extra copy is for you to keep.)
(5) Please put all forms where I can co-sign and collect them during
the experiment.
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(6) Today you will play two games–each more than once.
(7) Your earnings depend on how well you play the games.
(8) Your decisions and earnings will be anonymous. You will be
identified by the number on the front of your folder. When we
begin, you will enter the folder number into the computer.
(9) In all games, we use “tokens” for game money. The value of a
token in real money is different in each game. You will learn the
value before you begin each game.
(10) After the games, we will calculate and distribute earnings, in
cash, in envelopes marked with your folder number. A research
foundation has provided the funds for this study.
(11) Please stay silent throughout this experimental session and keep
your attention on your own computer.
(12) Please raise your hand if you have a question. I will answer
questions individually.
(13) Please take out the pink sheet, marked “Game 1” and close your
folder until I tell you to open it again.
(14) Please read along with me.
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Game 1 Instructions
[NB: These results are not discussed in this paper]
This is a game of group and individual investment behavior.
• You are in a group of 4 with 3 others, chosen at random.
• You have an endowment of 50 tokens to invest. Others have the
same endowment.
• You invest your tokens in the Individual Exchange and the Group
Exchange.
• Your earnings depend on how you and your group invest tokens.
• 50 tokens = $1.00.
Every token you invest in the Individual Exchange returns one token
in earnings to you only.
Every token you invest in the Group Exchange returns 0.5 tokens in
earnings to every member of your group, including yourself. It does not
matter who invests in the Group Exchange — everyone gets a return
from every token invested in the Group Exchange, whether or not they
invested.
Your task is to maximize your earnings by choosing how many of
your tokens to invest in the Group Exchange. (Remaining tokens go to
the Individual Exchange.) Examples:
1 2 3
Your Group Exchange investment 0 50 30
Your Individual Exchange investment 50 0 20
If others’ Group Exchange investments total 90 110 0
. . . total Group Exchange investment is . . . 0 + 90 = 90 50 + 110 = 160 30 + 0 = 30
. . . and everyone’s Group Exchange return is 90/2 = 45 160/2 = 80 30/2 = 15
Your total earnings (in tokens) are 50 + 45 = 95 0 + 80 = 80 20 + 15 = 35
Game Timing
(1) All members of your group start with a simultaneous investment
in the Group Exchange (Round 1). Click “Continue” after you
enter your choice. You only have 20 seconds to click. A countdown
clock is in the top-right corner of your screen.
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(2) In Round 2 and thereafter, you will (one person at a time) see
the TOTAL investment in the Group Exchange. You will change
or confirm your Group Exchange investment and click “Continue”.
You only have 10 seconds to click. If you take too long, your choice
does not change.
(3) The opportunity to see the total and change/confirm passes from
person to person in your group for an unknown, random number of
rounds until the game ends, and all investments are final. You will
have at least one opportunity to change/confirm your investment.
Although you must wait while the decision passes around your
group, try to pay attention so as to not to miss your turn.
(4) When each game ends, you will see your investment, the total
investment in the Group Exchange, your earnings from the current
game, and your cumulative earnings.
(5) When the game repeats, players are randomly reshuffled into new
groups and the final round changes to a new, random number.
(6) We will begin now. The first thing you will do is enter your Folder
Number.
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Game 2 Instructions
[NB: The game was originally played for 24 periods with the first
treatment played for 8 periods, a different treatment for 8 periods, and
the first treatment again for 8 periods. This design was faulty, as it
introduced “contamination” (bias and noise) into the middle periods
and final periods. Although results in periods 17–24 did not contradict
results in periods 1–8, those results are dropped to avoid bias.]
As in Game 1, you divide 50 tokens between the Individual and
Group Exchanges. Game 2 differs from Game 1 in these ways:
(1) We will play two versions of this game.
(2) You will be in the same group of four throughout this game.
(3) The timing is thus:
(a) All members of your group make a simultaneous investment
in the Group Exchange.
(b) The game ends, and you see your results.
(c) The game repeats.
(d) After 8 periods, we play a different version for 8 more periods.
We then play the first version again, for 8 more periods. (24
periods total).
(e) You are in the same group with the same players for all 24
periods.
(f) For each version, you have 40 seconds to make your decision
in the first period only; in other periods, you have 20 seconds.
(As usual, hit the OK button to record your choice.)
(4) You earn Raw Tokens from the Individual and Group Exchanges
(as before). Raw tokens are adjusted according to the version of
the game [the following pages describe each of the four versions]
we are playing to get Final Tokens. I’ll explain this in a minute.
(5) 50 Final Tokens = $0.20.
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Version: No Change [Treatment 1]
Say that you make the same contributions in the same way as in the
previous game, for example:
Your Group Exchange (GE) investment 32 0
Your Individual Exchange investment 18 50
GE investments from others in your group 57 90
. . . total GE investment for your group is . . . 32 + 57 = 89 0 + 90 = 90
. . . and GE return to members of your group is 89/2 = 44.5 90/2 = 45
Your raw earnings (in tokens) are 18 + 44.5 = 62.5 50 + 45 = 95
Modification
None — your raw token earnings and final token earnings are the same,
for example, you get 62.5 (or 95) final tokens.
Screenshot of Profit Calculation
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Version: Own Group [Treatment 2]
Say that you make the same contributions in the same way as in the
previous game, for example:
Your Group Exchange (GE) investment 32 0
Your Individual Exchange investment 18 50
GE investments from others in your group 57 90
. . . total GE investment for your group is . . . 32 + 57 = 89 0 + 90 = 90
. . . and GE return to members of your group is 89/2 = 44.5 90/2 = 45
Your raw earnings (in tokens) are 18 + 44.5 = 62.5 50 + 45 = 95
Modification
Each group shares 300 final tokens according to players’ raw token
earnings. Your final earnings depend on your raw earnings relative to
others in your group. For example:
Your raw earnings (in tokens) 71 71
Your group’s total raw earnings 306 262
Your share of your group’s total 71/306 = 23.2% 27.1%
Your final earnings (in tokens) 23.2% ∗ 300 = 69.6 81.3
Screenshot of Profit Calculation
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Version: People in Other Groups [Treatment 3]
Say that you make the same contributions in the same way as in the
previous game, for example:
Your Group Exchange (GE) investment 32 0
Your Individual Exchange investment 18 50
GE investments from others in your group 57 90
. . . total GE investment for your group is . . . 32 + 57 = 89 0 + 90 = 90
. . . and GE return to members of your group is 89/2 = 44.5 90/2 = 45
Your raw earnings (in tokens) are 18 + 44.5 = 62.5 50 + 45 = 95
Modification
“Targeted” individual earnings are 75 tokens, but you can get more if
your raw earnings relative to players in other groups (not your own
group) are higher — or less if your relative earning are lower. For
example:
Your raw earnings 91.0 91.0
Average for players in other groups 69.7 53
Your earnings vs. average player in other groups 91/69.7 = 130.6% 179%
Your final earnings 130.6% ∗ 75 = 98 135
Screenshot of Profit Calculation
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Version: All Players [Treatment 4]
Say that you make the same contributions in the same way as in the
previous game, for example:
Your Group Exchange (GE) investment 32 0
Your Individual Exchange investment 18 50
GE investments from others in your group 57 90
. . . total GE investment for your group is . . . 32 + 57 = 89 0 + 90 = 90
. . . and GE return to members of your group is 89/2 = 44.5 90/2 = 45
Your raw earnings (in tokens) are 18 + 44.5 = 62.5 50 + 45 = 95
Modification
The quantity of final tokens available to all players is fixed at 1,200 for
16 players (or 1,500 for 20 players). Your final earnings rise (or fall) as
your share of total raw earnings rises (or falls). For example:
Your raw earnings 42 42
Raw earnings, 16 players 1,150 743
Your share of total 42/1150 = 3.7% 5.7%
Your final earnings 3.7% ∗ 1, 200 = 43.8 67.8
Screenshot of Profit Calculation
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